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GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOCIAL MEANING OF GENETIC 
INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 
KEN M. GATTER* 
PART I – INTRODUCTION 
Current genetic information laws are controversial and confusing.1  Some 
people advocate stronger legal safeguards for any use of genetic information 
and others complain that current state and federal regulations are overly 
protective.  The critics assert that the laws fail to adequately distinguish 
between clinical and research contexts.2  They complain that new genetic 
privacy statutes make genetic research too onerous and will curtail important 
medical research.  In the New England Journal of Medicine, representatives of 
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 1. Health law practitioners acknowledge confusion surrounding health information 
generally, commenting that, “No concrete scheme for regulating the collection, storage, use, and 
disclosure of human biological data presently exists, giving rise to much speculation and debate 
over how and by whom this information should be monitored and controlled.”  Karen E. Glover 
et al., Collisions at the Intersection: Law and Bioinformatics, 11 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 233, 233 
(2002).  State laws regulating medical privacy have been described as a “morass” and “erratic.”  
See Andrew A. Skolnick, Opposition to Law Officers Having Unfettered Access to Medical 
Records, 279 JAMA 257, 257 (1998). 
 2. For a good critical overview of many of the issues surrounding medical research on 
human subjects, see Beverly Woodward, Challenges to Human Subject Protections in US 
Medical Research, 282 JAMA 1947 (1999).  Woodward writes, 
In recent years, however, in discussions regarding consent requirements, expedited 
review, medical privacy, genetic studies, research with the mentally ill, and other topics, it 
has become common to read or hear statements by medical researchers that assert the 
primacy of the interests of science and society and that place the burden of justification on 
those who would put any obstacles in the way of scientific and societal goals. These 
assertions are often accompanied by an unwillingness to admit that there are any true 
conflicts between progress of science and the protection of human subjects. 
Id. at 1948.  See also Jocelyn Kaiser, Researchers Say Rules Are Too Restrictive, 294 SCI. 2070 
(2001); L. Joseph Melton III, The Threat to Medical-Records Research, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1466 (1997) (reviewing medical records research at the Mayo Clinic and discussing Minnesota’s 
statute limiting access to medical records for research purposes). 
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the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) warn that genetic 
privacy rules that “restrict or prohibit the release of medical information for 
research purposes . . . . might marginally enhance patient privacy, but at a 
potentially steep cost to public health.”3  The Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services received a letter in November of 2001 from the 
AAMC, various researchers and academic hospitals warning that regulations 
safeguarding genetic information severely threatened medical research.4 
Most arguments for a distinction between research and clinical contexts are 
practical ones.  The arguments fall into three general categories.  The first is 
that genetic privacy statutes will lead to less research.  The second is that 
genetic information in the research context is unlikely to lead to discrimination 
in the workplace or health insurance.5  The third argument is that it is difficult 
to distinguish between genetic information and other medical information.6 
In this article, I propose a theoretical position for developing legal 
safeguards that recognize a distinction between genetic information in the 
research and clinical contexts.  The role of individual identity is central to my 
criticism of how current regulations over-protect all genetic information.  
Identity is also the keystone to my proposed alternative regulatory scheme for 
genetic information. 
The analysis begins with a critique of the current regulatory approach to 
protecting all genetic information regardless of context or substance.  Many 
legal safeguards designed to protect individuals from misuse of their genetic 
information focus only on the fact that the information is genetic instead of 
looking at the substantive content that the genetic information represents.  This 
myopia detrimentally alters the social meaning7 of genetic information by 
 
 3. Jennifer Kulynych & David Korn, The Effect of the New Federal Medical-Privacy Rule 
on Research, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 201 (2002). 
 4. Id.  Kulynych and Korn note that over 180 “leading research universities, medical 
schools, teaching and community hospitals, and medical specialty and scientific societies” signed 
the letter.  Id. at 204 n.2.  On March 27, 2002, Secretary Thompson proposed to modify the 
federal medical privacy rule.  The AAMC submitted a formal comment letter on April 11, 2002.  
See Letter from Jordan J. Cohen, M.D., Association of American Medical Colleges, to Tommy G. 
Thompson, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Apr. 11, 2002), 
available at http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/library/hipaa/corres/2002/041102.htm. 
 5. This statement is supported by various rationales, including that researchers do not 
disclose information that is easily connected to any particular individual.  Another point is that 
the information from research is not useful to insurers or employers because research typically 
addresses small questions and the answers do not have clinical significance without extensive 
additional research. 
 6. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End 
to Genetic Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1999). 
 7. There are many articles and books written on the subjects of social meaning, norms and 
social construction.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sustein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 
(1996); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
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promoting the idea that a person’s DNA is the essence of a person.  Laws 
should instead regard genetic information as representing one attribute among 
many other important attributes, such as personality, ambition and character. 
When the law protects information only because it is genetic, then the law 
encourages a shift in the social meaning of genetic information toward a 
“genetic essentialism.”  This change in social meaning alters our notions of 
identity.  It is one thing to believe that our future health is heavily influenced 
by our individual genetic make-up.  It is quite another thing to believe that we 
are “nothing more than our genes.”  This change in the social meaning of 
genetic information that our current regulatory scheme promotes has 
deleterious effects on our identity and our belief in autonomy. 
Laws must consider the context within which genetic information arises to 
prevent erosion of beliefs in autonomy and identity.  The law should protect 
genetic information in the clinical context since such information likely has 
concrete clinical meaning and might lead to discrimination.8  In the clinical 
setting, a person’s genetic information may form a substantial portion of their 
identity.  However, even in the clinical setting, an individual’s identity is more 
than a mere sum of genomic information, just as it is greater than a list of his 
or her physical ailments.  Admittedly, genetic information may have attributes 
similar to race, religion, gender and other features of identity that might lead to 
discrimination and comprise an essential part of a person’s sense of who he or 
she is.  However, in the research context, genetic attributes are typically not yet 
tied to identity because the genetic information uncovered is unlikely to have 
clinical significance.  In other words, why should the law grant a privacy 
interest to every individual’s entire genetic information regardless of whether 
the information has any clinical significance or is likely to lead to 
discrimination?  Why should the law grant a privacy interest to genetic 
information that says nothing meaningful about an individual’s identity?  If the 
law protects this kind of information only because it is genetic, this changes 
the social meaning of genetic information and individual identity. 
I propose a way to recognize the context within which genetic information 
arises and a fluid means to evaluate when genetic information becomes 
sufficiently tied to individual identity to merit legal protection.  This approach 
 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).  The author applies law and norms theory to 
scientific research and concludes that laws that “reinforce and reflect efficient norms” are 
superior.  Id. at 80.  One facet of many social norm theories is that the social meaning must 
remain uncovered to be effective.  As soon as society’s members become aware that the particular 
social meaning is socially constructed then the meaning changes.  See generally ROBERTO 
MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK (1987). 
 8. But see Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What is Wrong with Genetic 
Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1482 (2001) (concluding that a “regime of genetic 
transparency” rather than concentrating on genetic privacy is better on the grounds of fairness and 
efficiency). 
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focuses on the substantive character of the information instead of elevating 
information on the exclusive criteria of whether it is genetic (as many genetic 
privacy statutes do), thereby undermining traditional constructs of identity.  
For example, under the proposed approach genetic research that uncovers 
whether a person has a substantial risk for developing a serious neurological 
disorder would merit strong legal protections because the information 
reasonably impacts the individual’s identity.9  In contrast, research looking at 
genetic information that does not have clinical significance should not receive 
legal protections because it does not reasonably impact individual identity.  
The vehicle that will distinguish between these two contexts, as well as allow 
fluidity in the large area between these two examples, is the tort of 
misappropriation of identity.10 
This article has two main points.  The first part discusses how genetic 
privacy statutes that do not distinguish between the research and clinical 
contexts change the social meaning of genetic information.  The second part 
addresses the proposed alternative approach, which borrows the tort of 
misappropriation of identity from tort law.  Rather than protecting genetic 
information solely because it is genetic information, the tort of 
misappropriation of identity keeps our emphasis on traditional elements of 
individual identity, protecting those pieces of information that might 
reasonably impact identity.  Instead of elevating genetic information and 
thereby adversely altering its social meaning, the tort of misappropriation of 
identity provides a way to more accurately describe the individual interests at 
stake in the use of genetic information.  This proposed approach allows a 
distinction between research and clinical contexts as well as between different 
kinds of research contexts involving genetic information.  Most importantly, it 
enables the law to take into consideration the context within which we collect 
and use genetic information.  This reduces the adverse impact on identity 
promoted by the current law’s effect on the social meaning of genetic 
information. 
Part II discusses genetic exceptionalism and several writers’ views about 
the risks of genetic exceptionalism, including how genetic exceptionalism 
 
 9. Interestingly, federal regulations (“CLIAA”) require that a lab be accredited before any 
clinically significant lab results are passed on to the patient.  Since most research labs are not 
CLIAA approved, the regulation prohibits the passing on of lab results to the patient or research 
participant. 
 10. See Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and The Eclipse of 
the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 214 (1999) [hereinafter 
Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light]; Jonathan Kahn, Biotechnology and The Legal 
Constitution of the Self: Managing Identity In Science, the Market, and Society, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 
909 (2000) [hereinafter Kahn, Biotechnology].  Other commentators advocate using the tort of 
intrusion on seclusion to protect individual interests in genetic privacy.  See also June Mary Z. 
Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion A New Tort, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 965 (2001). 
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leads to a reductionist view of identity.  The section relies on the example of 
HIV exceptionalism for guidance.  Part III elaborates on the difference 
between genetic information in the research and clinical contexts.  Part IV 
discusses an alternative approach for genetic protection statutes that focuses on 
the substance of the genetic information.  The proposal centers on a 
misappropriation of identity method. Part V offers a conclusion. 
PART II - GENETIC EXCEPTIONALISM 
“You,” your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your 
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the 
[genetically determined] behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their 
associated molecules.11 
Francis Crick and James Watson described the double helix structure of 
DNA in the early 1950s.12  Fifty years later, many people routinely ascribe 
quirks and family traits to “it’s genetic.”  Although Crick’s view about the 
extent of genetics in forming every aspect of our lives may be exuberant, many 
share his view of the power of genetics and its predominance in describing 
who and what we are.  Legal commentators also describe genetic information 
as fundamentally different from other types of personal information.13 
Many people are apprehensive about the potential for misuse of  genetic 
information. Employers or health care insurers may use genetic information to 
discriminate against people because their genetic information indicates a 
greater risk of disease and expense.14  A national survey in 1997 showed that 
two-thirds of respondents would refuse to participate in a genetic test if 
employers or health insurers could see the results.15  Greater than eighty 
percent of the respondents favored prohibitions against employers or insurers 
having access to an individual’s genetic information.16  A genetics counselor at 
 
 11. FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE 
SOUL 3 (1994). 
 12. See J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Genetic Implications of the Structure of 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 964 (1953). 
 13. See, e.g., Lynda M. Fox & Barbara A. Kakenmaster, The Genetic Privacy Act: Proposed 
Model Legislation, 24 COLO. LAW. 2317, 2317 (1995). The authors write, “The major premise 
underlying the Act is that genetic information is different from other types of personal 
information and, thus, requires special protection.”  Id. 
 14. See generally Diver & Cohen, supra note 8.  The authors advocate a legal strategy of 
“genetic transparency” to “enable our society to confront openly its phobias about genetic 
diversity and begin, at last, fully to appreciate its blessings.”  Id. at 1482.  The authors use an 
economic analysis to reach their conclusion, maintaining that the prohibition of all genetic 
discrimination, although well-intentioned, would lead to significant welfare losses due to the 
“distortion of allocative efficiency.”  Id. at 1445. 
 15. Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
189, 189 (1998). 
 16. Id. 
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the University of California, Los Angeles (U.C.L.A.), reported that nearly 80% 
of people getting a genetic test for Huntington’s disease would rather pay out 
of pocket than allow their insurance companies access to the information.17  
The dissemination of genetic information might also wreak havoc in other 
aspects of a person’s life.  For example, a potential spouse may change his or 
her mind about marriage or one’s partner may decide against having children 
because of the other’s genetic profile.  Family and friends may pity, shun or 
avoid a person because of what they know, or think they know, about an 
individual’s genes. 
Others are fearful that genetic information might tell them some 
information about themselves that they would rather not know.  For example, 
they might be told about the high probability of dementia after a certain age, an 
incurable disease, or a disease curable only with great suffering, time, 
monetary expense and familial burdens.  Commentators cite many scenarios in 
support of the right not to know.18 
Commentators also write about how genetic information is different than 
other types of information because it invokes the interests of the family as well 
as the individual.  They ask about what rights and interests might protect 
genetic family members who do not want to know.  Some argue that genetic 
information is different from family history because of the increased 
specificity and reliability of genetic results.  When family members retell their 
family history, their memories are often inaccurate.  They may be misinformed 
about what disease a relative had, or they may deny certain family 
propensities.  Genetic information suffers from none of these human frailties.  
It is one thing to know that dementia runs in your family.  It is quite another 
thing to know that you carry a gene that gives you a 75% chance of developing 
dementia by the time you are sixty-five years old. 
Whether people view genetic information as more dangerous, more 
powerful or more complete, the belief that genetic information is different 
from other types of information is ubiquitous.  This view has generated 
numerous legal commentators to argue that genetic information is 
fundamentally different and inherently requires additional protections.  For 
example, George Annas describes genetic information as “a future diary.”19 
Although he admits it is “in code and probabilistic,” Annas argues that 
 
 17. Antonio Regalado, Confidential! Genetics Research is Prompting Calls for New Privacy 
Laws, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2001, at R10. 
 18. See, e.g., Richard S. Fedder, To Know or Not to Know: Legal Perspectives on Genetic 
Privacy and Disclosure of an Individual’s Genetic Profile, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 557 (2000); 
Graeme T. Laurie, Challenging Medical-Legal Norms: The Role of Autonomy, Confidentiality, 
and Privacy in Protecting Individual and Familial Group Rights in Genetic Information, 22 J. 
LEGAL MED. 1 (2001). 
 19. George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be a Law, 4  TEX. REV. L. & POL.  9, 
11 (1999). 
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“genetic information should be seen as private because it is in essence a 
reverse diary: it informs our younger selves about our aging selves.”20 Many 
state21 and federal22 genetic privacy statutes and regulations, as well as pending 
 
 20. See id.  Professor Annas states, in full: 
But you can think about your DNA molecule as a “future diary.”  It is in code and 
probabilistic, but just as private.  It is information about you, information about which you 
should have a right not to know, a right to say, “I don’t want to know this.”  But even if 
you want to know it, you should have a right to say, “I don’t want anybody else to know 
it.  I don’t want my employer to know it.  I don’t want the FBI to know it.  I don’t want 
my school to know it.  I don’t want my colleagues to know it.  I don’t want my spouse to 
know it.  I don’t want my children to know it.” 
Id. at 11.  Professor Annas emphasizes that it is the fact that we treat genetic information as 
different from other types of information that supports special legal protections for genetic 
information.  He argues that genetic information is different only in the sense that it should 
receive special legal protections because it involves three of the four different facets of privacy.  
Elsewhere, Professor Annas has also written that the issues raised by the Human Genome Project 
are not unique.  Rather, they bring issues into focus.  Whereas the issues might not be unique for 
Annas, he does advocate a property based right in genetic information.  See also George J. Annas, 
Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning of Monster Mythology, 39 EMORY L.J. 629, 640 
(1990). 
 21. All states have legislation that restricts access to medical records.  As of April 2002, 
thirty states had a statute that specifically addressed genetic information.  Twenty-three states had 
laws requiring informed consent for disclosure of genetic information.  Four states defined 
genetic information in terms of personal property.  National Conference of State Legislatures, 
State Genetic Privacy Laws, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last 
updated Apr. 15, 2002).  Another account claims that at least forty states have statutes that 
provide protections for genetic information, although the strength of the protections varies.  Janet 
L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66  BROOK. L. REV. 755, 781 
(2001)  (indicating that the disparity is partially explained by the pattern of state laws addressing 
medical privacy, which has been described as a “ morass” and “erratic.”).  See also Andrew A. 
Skolnick, Opposition to Law Officers Having Unfettered Access to Medical Records, 279 JAMA 
257 (1998); Joy Pritts et al., The State of Health Privacy: An Uneven Terrain: A Comprehensive 
Survey of State Health Privacy Statutes (1999), available at http://www.healthprivacy.org/ 
usr_doc/35309.pdf. 
 22. See, for example, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
which protects against genetic discrimination and invasion of privacy.  Compliance with privacy 
concerns is the most important issue heading into 2002 according to an advisory board of health 
care attorneys put together by the Health Law Reporter.  See M. Alexander Otto & Barbara Yuill, 
Privacy Rule Still Dominates Health Practice; Attention Focuses on Bioterrorism Planning, 11 
BNA HEALTH L. REP. 5 (2002).  Cost estimates for implementation of privacy rules under 
HIPAA, published in 2000, were $17.6 billion over ten years.  See Proposal Would Lower Price 
of Privacy Rule Under Research, Other Provisions, HHS Says, MED. RES. L. & POL’Y REP., Apr. 
3, 2002, at 36, 36.  Recent proposed revisions of HIPAA’s privacy rule is aimed at reducing 
researcher’s burdens.  Id. at 37.  Other applicable federal laws include the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (applicable to federal agencies); the Americans with Disabilities Act,  42 
U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) (requiring confidential employee records); 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b)(3) 
(1999) (Medicare regulations requiring hospitals to ensure confidentiality of medical records); 
and the common rule, where the federal regulation for the protection of human subjects in 
research places significant oversight with the Institutional Review Boards.  See 45 C.F.R. § 46 
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legislation,23 provide specific protections for genetic information and view 
genetic information as special.  For instance, the Oregon Genetic Privacy Act 
includes a legislative finding that “genetic information is uniquely private and 
personal information.” 24  Statutes like this one protect genetic privacy as a 
distinct form of medical information that merits protection separate from the 
already existing statutory protections for medical and research information.  
These statutes view genetic information as exceptional. 
A. HIV exceptionalism and genetic exceptionalism25 
The idea that certain types of information are exceptional is not new.  For 
example, in the early 1990s, Ronald Bayer described our policy of treating 
HIV infection as an exceptional disease.26  He termed this “HIV 
 
(2000).  In addition, there is pending federal legislation with ramifications on the use of genetic 
information included in one joint resolution, and ten bills in the Senate and House of 
Representatives.  National Cancer Institute, Genetic Privacy, Discrimination and Medical 
Information, at http://www3.cancer.gov/legis/june02/genetic.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2002) 
(summarizing the pending legislation). 
 23. As of May 2002, pending federal legislation with some ramification on the use of genetic 
information included one joint resolution (H.R.J. Res. 38), and ten bills in the Senate and House 
of Representative.  National Cancer Institute, supra note 24. 
 24. Statutes like Oregon’s revised Genetic Privacy Statute, S. 114, codified at OR. REV. 
STAT. § 192.531, do distinguish between anonymous genetic information and other types of 
genetic information, but even anonymous genetic information is treated as exceptional and 
requires additional steps when a person agrees that their tissue may be used for genetic research.  
Commentators have pointed out that genetic information with only limited identifying 
information may adversely impact groups as well as individuals, but this is also true for other 
types of information such as race.  A different approach from the one taken by genetic privacy 
statutes of focusing on all genetic information regardless of the substantive effects of the 
information, is arguably offered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.  See Laura F. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination: Why Bragdon Does Not 
Ensure Protection, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 330 (2000).  But see EEOC COMPL. MAN.  § 
902.8 (classifying asymptomatic genetic conditions as disabilities because persons with such 
conditions may be regarded as having a disability). 
 25. Others have looked to the HIV exceptionalism debate to gain insight into genetic 
exceptionalism.  See Zita Lazzarini, What Lessons We Learn From the Exceptionalism Debate 
(Finally)?, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149 (2001).  Lazzarini instructs that 
[t]he point is not whether genetic information or HIV should be treated as all other 
diseases are treated now, but how should we resolve that period of social negotiation that 
inevitably follows new discoveries or threats, and how will that response inform our ways 
of dealing with “old” information or threats. 
Id. at 150.  Lazzarini also asserts that “[a]s a society, we need to assess the real threats to privacy 
and dignity that genetics pose.”  Id. at 151.  I undertake an examination of the real threat of 
genetics. 
 26. Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIV 
Exceptionalism? 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1500-04 (1991) [hereinafter Bayer, Public Health 
Policy].  See also Ronald Bayer et al., HIV Antibody Screening: An Ethical Framework for 
Evaluating Proposed Programs, 256 JAMA 1768, 1768-74 (1986) [hereinafter Bayer, HIV 
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exceptionalism” because our laws and health system treated HIV infection 
differently from other diseases.27  Bayer painted the background of a 
traditional public health approach, which arose in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, as a system that emphasized mandatory reporting to public 
health registries and compulsory testing.28  HIV, he argued, stands in relief, 
emerging as exceptional.29  This is evident by looking at how people were 
tested and screened for the disease, how the information was stored, and how 
our legal and health care systems implemented protections for the identity of 
HIV positive patients.  Unlike other infectious diseases, HIV testing required 
specific consent, instead of the presumed consent accompanying most blood 
tests for infectious diseases.30  The exceptional status of HIV infection is 
evident when a New York State court supported the state health commissioner 
in refusing to categorize HIV infection as a sexually transmitted and 
communicable disease.31 
Bayer agreed that the justification for treating HIV infection differently lay 
largely in the great potential for stigmatization and discrimination.32  
According to Bayer, this civil liberties-sensitive approach was brought about 
by the relatively strong political power of gay men.33  One of the reasons for 
the declining influence of HIV exceptionalism was the shift in risk of infection 
away from homosexual men and toward minority drug users.34  Bayer 
remarked, “Not only do black and Hispanic drug users lack the capacity to 
influence policy in the way homosexual men have done, but also those who 
speak on their behalf often lack the singular commitment to privacy and 
consent that so characterized the posture of gay organizations.”35  For Bayer, 
HIV exceptionalism was largely a result of political forces.36 
 
Antibody Screening]; Kevin M. De Cock & Anne M. Johnson, From Exceptionalism to 
Normalisation: A Reappraisal of Attitudes and Practices Around HIV Testing, 316 BRIT. MED. J. 
290-93 (1998). 
 27. See generally Bayer, Public Health Policy, supra note 26. 
 28. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and Public Health: A Study of Infectious 
Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59 (1999) (insightful article on the law, 
public health and infectious disease). 
 29. Bayer, Public Health Policy, supra note 26, at 1501. 
 30. Id. 
 31. N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 607 (N.Y. 1991). 
 32. See Bayer, HIV Antibody Screening, supra note 26, at 1768. 
 33. Bayer, Public Health Policy, supra note 26, at 1503. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  Bayer notes other reasons for the end of HIV exceptionalism.  These include the 
existence of more effective drugs for the treatment of HIV and the clinical understanding of the 
benefits of early treatment. See Ronald Bayer, Clinical Progress and the Future of HIV 
Exceptionalism, 159 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1042 (1999). 
 36. Bayer, Public Health Policy, supra note 26, at 1502. 
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Bayer’s objection to HIV exceptionalism was that it interfered with our 
ability to best prevent new infections and diagnose current ones.37  He 
described recent trends with relief: “[T]he first decade of the epidemic came to 
an end, public health officials began to assert their professional dominance 
over the policy-making process and in so doing began to rediscover the 
relevance of their own professional traditions to the control of AIDS.”38  In 
Bayer’s view, HIV exceptionalism was problematic because it represented a 
politically driven change in the social meaning of AIDS that had deleterious 
effects on the public health system’s ability to effectively contain and treat the 
disease.39 
How did HIV exceptionalism change the social meaning of the disease?  
The social meaning of “being HIV positive” was fundamentally different from 
“having syphilis” or “having heart disease.”  The difference in description of 
“having” verses “being” illustrates how HIV infection consumed an 
individual’s identity to a greater degree.  By categorizing HIV as exceptional, 
the social meaning of HIV infection took away some of the individual’s ability 
to define his or her own identity.  No matter what, once infected with HIV, 
people thought of themselves and were considered by others, HIV positive.  
Presumably, it was worse to be HIV positive than to be just about anything 
else, in part, because of the certainty of death in the relatively near future and, 
in part, because of the great risk of discrimination.  It made sense that the legal 
protections for individuals with HIV should be stronger because of what it 
meant to be HIV positive.  However, in doing so, the legal protections also 
impacted what it meant to be HIV positive. 
More recently, Friedman Ross compared HIV with genetic information to 
address whether genetic information is exceptional.40  She began with the 
proposition that HIV infection is not exceptional, as shown by the present day 
“normalization of HIV management.”41  She then examined whether 
differences between genetic information and HIV infection succeed in setting 
the former apart.42  She discussed various attributes, including the potential for 
eugenics, the impact on family, and the probabilistic character of genetics.43  
Ross concluded that genetic information is not exceptional, relying on her 
analysis of the attributes mentioned, as well as on Gostin and Hodges, who 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1502. 
 39. Id. at 1503-04. 
 40. Lainie Friedman Ross, Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigm Shift: Lessons from HIV, 
29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 141 (2001). 
 41. Id. at 141-42. 
 42. Id. at 142-43. 
 43. Id. at 143. 
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argue against genetic exceptionalism largely on the basis of how closely 
genetic information melds with other medical information.44 
Interestingly, Ross seeks the answer to whether genetic information is 
objectively different from HIV infection and other kinds of information, while 
implicitly assuming that we  know.45  Ross argues that if genetic information is 
not different, we should not treat it as exceptional.46  One problem is that in 
many ways genetic information does seem different.  Powerful techniques are 
associated with genetic information.  From a cheek swab, a person’s entire 
genetic sequence might be generated, with great amounts of potential and 
predictive information about the individual’s future and her family, including 
children not yet conceived. 
Scott Burris offers a different approach to the exceptionalism debate in his 
critique of Bayer.47  His insightful conclusion is that society and the law’s 
treatment of HIV is both similar and fundamentally different.48  Burris argues 
that we never treated HIV differently.49  Descriptions of HIV as exceptional 
rely on sentimental and inaccurate views of the past.50  According to Burris, 
the “norm” that HIV must contrast against in order to attain exceptional status 
never existed.51  Instead, HIV appears much like other “killer diseases of the 
past,” and is similar to other politicized diseases like syphilis, tuberculosis and 
cholera.52 
Burris argues the political, public health and societal reaction to HIV is 
part of a paradigm shift.  The shift is toward a paradigm that places an 
emphasis on reducing the fear and stigma from certain “killer diseases.”  In the 
past, fear and stigma have stood in the way of more effective disease control.  
In contrast, our recent collective reaction to HIV and AIDS represents a 
movement to lessen the harmful effects of the fear and stigma as well as 
allowing more effective public health control of the disease itself.  For 
example, many people expressed concern early on in the AIDS story about 
potentially infected patients who did not seek testing because they were 
worried about the possible effects of a publicized positive test result or even 
dissemination of the information that they had simply sought out a screening 
test for HIV.  Increasing consent and confidentiality requirements lessened the 
 
 44. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 6, at 21. 
 45. Ross, supra note 40, at 142-43. 
 46. Id. at 145. 
 47. See Scott Burris, Public Health, “AIDS Exceptionalism” and the Law, 27 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 251 (1994) [hereinafter Burris, Public Health]; Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of 
Health Care: Lessons form HIV Testing, 61 ALB. L. REV. 831 (1998). 
 48. Burris, Public Health, supra note 47, at 255. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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fear and made it easier to treat and potentially prevent HIV.  Burris concludes 
by stating that HIV was never exceptional.  Instead, HIV represents a different 
and better approach to the way that law, medicine, and public health treat 
disease that threatens distinct groups and becomes inevitably politicized.  For 
Burris, HIV is “unique but not exceptional.”53 
Although Burris and Bayer reach different conclusions about the benefit of 
HIV “exceptionalism” or “uniqueness,” they both use the effectiveness of the 
public health system to control and treat the disease as the bellwether for their 
conclusions.  However, Burris takes the argument a step further by considering 
the meaning of our belief that we treated HIV infection differently. 
Burris’ approach teaches us to ask not whether genetic information 
represents a new and exceptional threat to privacy, but to use the question, “Is 
genetic information exceptional?” as a starting point.  We should, instead, ask 
the more informative question of what it means that many people, including 
many legislators and some judges, believe that genetic information is 
exceptional.  Answering this question gives insight as to what might be a better 
legal approach for the protection of genetic information. 
B. The Social Meaning Of Genetic Exceptionalism 
The anthropologist Kaja Finkler describes today’s world of “gene 
hegemony,” writing: 
[E]verything about an organism’s existence is predetermined and genetically 
programmed, including its variation, although geneticists recognize that the 
program may be affected by unknown and external factors in the environment, 
chance, or human manipulation.  The sequence of our DNA reveals to us who 
and what we are; that is, what it means to be human.  With DNA sequencing, 
some scientists have maintained that the riddle of life is close to being 
solved.54 
The belief in the gene and belief in biological determinism go hand in hand.  
Perhaps it is the neatness of this fit that appeals to many people.  Dorothy 
Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee expand on the widespread and profound effect of 
our belief in DNA. They describe a change in the social meaning of DNA: 
Just as the Christian soul has provided an archetypal concept through which to 
understand the person and continuity of self, so DNA appears in popular 
culture as a soul-like entity, a holy and immortal relic, a forbidden territory.  
The similarity between the powers of DNA and those of the Christian soul, we 
suggest, is more than linguistic or metaphorical.  DNA has taken on the social 
 
 53. Burris, Public Health, supra note 47, at 261. 
 54. KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS: FAMILY AND KINSHIP ON THE 
MEDICAL FRONTIER 48 (2000). 
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and cultural functions of the soul.  It is the essential entity—the location of the 
true self—in the narratives of biological determinism.55 
Nelkin and Lindee illustrate the dangerousness and divisiveness of the cultural 
importance we have given the gene.  The gene is powerful and deterministic.  
Nelkin and Lindee write, “[G]enetic explanations . . . construct difference as 
central to identity [and] definition of the self.”56  Differences attributed to 
genetic causes are powerful because they are immutable.  An individual’s 
genes, unlike behavior, cannot change during an individual’s lifetime.  Genetic 
explanations emphasize and formalize differences.  Placing the causes for our 
differences within our DNA means that efforts to change our thinking and 
social programs to promote changes in attitudes are unlikely to bring effective 
changes because they will not eliminate genetically caused behavioral traits. 
Not only do Nelkin and Lindee discuss the importance of genetic 
information in constructing our identity, but they also catalogue some of the 
results of genetic essentialism. They note how genetic essentialism appeals to 
those who want to emphasize individual responsibility and reduce 
governmental and societal responsibility for improving social conditions.57  
Although notions of the intrinsically individualistic character of each person’s 
unique DNA supports individual responsibility, the idea that behavior is 
predominantly influenced by genetic factors leads to the rhetoric of the futility 
of improving social conditions. 
This is the paradoxical element of genetic essentialism, which while 
fostering notions of individual responsibility, simultaneously undermines 
belief in autonomy.58  Biologically determined actions are often excused, since 
they are apart from freely chosen actions.59  The emphasis on the gene as the 
determinate force in our individual character leads to abolition of individual 
blame and responsibility.60  Instead, responsibility shifts to the individual’s 
genetic family.61 
Finkler explored the shift from more traditional notions of family based on 
a complex network of obligations and a tradition to the genetic family’s 
 
 55. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A 
CULTURAL ICON 41-42 (1995). 
 56. Id. at 126. 
 57. The explanation for behavior lies in the individual DNA and there can be little collective 
responsibility for behavior caused by such a personal and individualistic source.  Id. at 129.  
Social programs to improve living conditions are futile if personal attributes are not due to the 
interaction between one’s environment and one’s choices, but due to one’s genetic makeup.  
Nelkin and Lindee provide examples stories in the popular press of individuals with “good genes” 
who transcend the difficult environment in which they grow up.  See id. at 94-101. 
 58. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 55, at 129. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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emphasis on shared DNA alone.62  Finkler writes, “To sense that one forms 
part of a family chiefly because one shares the same genes, requiring no social 
participation nor sense of responsibility to those who are related except to 
provide blood samples for testing purposes, removes the moral context of 
family relationships.”63  Similarly, Janet Dolgin shows how the construction of 
a “genetic family” is evolving, and she urges us to proceed carefully when 
considering how we will allow genetic information to change our views about 
personhood and the nature of our relationships.  Dolgin sees the genetic family 
as a threat: 
The genetic family . . . is defined exclusively with reference to a genome.  In 
consequence, the locus of social value shifts from the individual to groups of 
apparently fungible individuals, and the autonomous individual constructed 
through, and understood in terms of, Enlightenment values, ceases to be 
essential. Moreover, the view that genes are shared substance and information 
facilitates depersonalization. . . .  A universe predicated on the notion of a 
genetic group would view the preservation of autonomy, and the protection of 
the individual, with indifference.64 
And, later on, she concludes that central to the “emerging ideological 
construct” of the “genetic family” is “the obliteration of privacy,” within the 
genetic family because the individuals are indistinguishable.65 
The courts provide an example of this shift toward a genetic family.  A 
New Jersey Superior Court decision in Safer v. Estate of Pack66 shows the 
expanding role of the idea of the genetic family and its potential threat to 
individual privacy and autonomy.  In Safer, the court expanded the scope of a 
physician’s duty to warn about increased risk for cancer to include family 
members if one family member is diagnosed with a cancer that has a hereditary 
component.67  Donna Safer, the daughter of a man who died twenty-six years 
earlier, sued her father’s doctor for failing to inform her of her increased risk of 
colon cancer.68  Since her cancer was the hereditary form, Donna Safer’s risk 
of colon cancer was increased (most colon cancer is not hereditary in this 
sense).  The New Jersey Superior Court found a duty to warn that extended to 
family members who were not the doctor’s patients, by stating, “Further, it is 
appropriate . . . that the duty be seen as owed not only to the patient himself 
but that it also ‘extend[s] beyond the interests of the patient to members of the 
immediate family of the patient who may be adversely affected by a breach of 
 
 62. FINKLER, supra note 54, at 48. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Dolgin, supra note 21, at 801. 
 65. Id. at 813. 
 66. 291 A.2d 1188 (1996). 
 67. Id. at 1191-1192. 
 68. Id. at 1190. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 437 
that duty.’”69  The decision treated the patient/father with the hereditary form 
of colon cancer as primarily a member of a genetic family.  The court focused 
on the daughter’s status as a member of the same genetic family as her father 
to expand the physician’s duty to inform to a person with whom the doctor has 
no patient-doctor relationship. Presumably, according to Safer, when a doctor 
now takes on a new patient, the doctor is also creating a doctor-patient 
relationship with the patient’s entire genetic family. 
This example illustrates how genetic information can limit not only the 
autonomy of the patient with colon cancer, but may also limit the individual 
autonomy of a family member who might not want to know that they have the 
“gene for colon cancer.”70  What if, in the example provided by Safer, the 
daughter did not want to know?  Although most people may want to know 
about an increased risk of hereditary colon cancer because of available and 
effective screening methods, the problem is more apparent if the disease is one 
like Huntington’s or Alzheimer’s disease.  A family member may not want to 
know about a disease whose onset is still years away and for which there is no 
effective treatment.71  Arguably, such genetic information may profoundly 
impact an individual’s identity.  It may also limit individual choices by overly 
weighting one side of a decision, such as a decision about whether to have 
children. 
This broad effect of genetic information is central to the problem.  Genetic 
information implicates and potentially infringes autonomy rights whether the 
law expands the right to know to family members, as in Safer, or whether it 
shields genetic privacy.72  The crux of the issue, and the point made by Dolgin, 
 
 69. Id. at 1192 (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 57 N.J. 53, 65, 432 A.2d 834 (1981)) (alteration 
in original). 
 70. Most colon cancers, and most human cancers, are not genetic in the sense that they are 
passed from one generation to the next.  Cancers are genetic in the sense that they are caused by 
genetic mutations, but current understanding is that the genetic mutations giving rise to most 
cancer are not passed from parent to child.  Instead, most cancers are caused by a series of genetic 
mutations that accumulate over time and survive in a population of cells that grows into a cancer.  
For example, most colon cancer arises in older people and involves a series of genetic mishaps.  
Genetic mutations are relatively common and there is a risk for a mutation every time a cell 
divides.  Most of the mutations are caught by the cell’s machinery and either fixed or the cell is 
killed or dies.  Over time, the risk that these safety mechanisms fail increases, partially explaining 
that many cancers are more common in older persons.  See generally RAMZI S. COTRAN ET AL., 
ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE (6th ed. 1999). 
 71. See MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS 
63 (1999).  Some estimate that only 20% of people would chose to know their fate if they could.  
Id. 
 72. The court in Safer recognized the potential conflict, stating, “It may be necessary, at 
some stage, to resolve a conflict between the physician’s broader duty to warn and his fidelity to 
an expressed preference of the patient that nothing be said to family members about the details of 
the disease.”  Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192-93.  The same predicament occurs within the setting of 
genetic research, where an individual who chooses not to participate may be affected by 
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is that the profound shift in the social meaning of genetic information occurs 
once decision makers begin balancing the interests of the individual with the 
diagnosed genetic attribute against the interests of genetic family members.73  
Although the genetic family members may or may not have the genetic 
attribute, the decision maker values both groups (the person with the genetic 
attribute and that person’s family members) similarly because the decision 
maker has elevated genetic information to an essential defining attribute. 
Genetic information begins to define us at the point where the focus is on the 
genetic character of the information rather than on the individual and his or her 
right to make a decision within the setting of traditional familial 
responsibilities and relationships. 
In Safer, the court allowed the genetic character of the information to 
change the meaning of the patient-doctor relationship and the daughter-father 
relationship.  Why should not the law respect the confidentiality of the patient-
doctor relationship and leave it up to family members to share the information 
if they choose?  If a doctor diagnoses a patient with syphilis, the general rule is 
that the doctor is under no obligation to tell the patient’s spouse.74  Why should 
the fact that the information is genetic change the legal responsibilities of 
keeping medical information confidential? 
Genetic information begins to define who we are when we look primarily 
at the fact that information is genetic rather than look at the substance of the 
genetic information.  Similar to the example of “being HIV positive,” we view 
 
information derived from genetic family members.  See Henry T. Greely, The Control of Genetic 
Research Involving the “Groups Between,” 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1397, 1411 (1997). 
 73. This balancing approach is used by The American Society of Human Genetics in their 
official statement about Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information.  Am. Soc’y of 
Human Genetics Subcommittee on Familial Disclosure, ASHG Statement: Professional 
Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information, 62 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 474 (1998).  The 
statement notes the case law established by Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, 
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), placing a general duty on third parties for foreseeable, serious and 
identifiable risks.  Id.  The statement also notes that foreign bodies, such as the World Health 
Organization and others, support limited disclosure to at-risk relatives provided the harm is grave 
and imminent and effective intervention is available.  The statement summary includes the 
following, “Moreover, where the harm is serious . . . and likely, and where prevention or 
treatment is available, the health-care professional may have a privilege to warn at risk relatives, 
irrespective of the patient’s wishes.”  Id. at 476 (emphasis added). 
 74. See generally Judy E. Zelin, Physician’s Tort Liability for Unauthorized disclosure of 
Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R. 4th 668 (1986) (discussing unauthorized 
disclosure by a physician of confidential information).  Various theories exist, including invasion 
of privacy, breach of the confidential doctor-patient relationship and malpractice.  A physician’s 
obligation to reveal confidential information to warn a third party was recognized in Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).  The case involved a 
psychotherapist whose patient killed Tarasoff.  The court restricted the duty to a foreseeable, 
serious injury to a reasonably identifiable victim.  Id. at 342.  The rule for psychotherapists is 
codified in CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 1997). 
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genetic traits as powerfully defining who an individual is, overriding the ability 
of individuals to treat genetic information as one piece of information to which 
we are able to give differing degrees of value and meaning.  Rather than 
allowing individuals to define themselves, we begin to allow genetic 
information to define the individuals.  In other words, a person’s genetic 
information that his or her eyes are green should be no different than other 
information that verifies the green color of his or her eyes, like a photograph of 
the person’s eyes or a testimonial that his or her eyes are green.  The law 
should protect this information if it is in a medical record because the law 
protects confidential information but not solely because the information is 
genetic.  In certain situations, the use of a photograph depicting someone is 
legally protected. Similar standards might be used to protect information that is 
genetic, as I will discuss. 
PART III - THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CLINICAL AND RESEARCH 
CONTEXTS OF GENETIC INFORMATION 
A. The Importance of Context in Genetic Information 
Genetic privacy statutes create a protective area around our genetic 
information.  Many of these statutes extend the zone of privacy around genetic 
families, which, as discussed above, concomitantly weakens the protections 
around individuals.75  Moreover, many genetic privacy statutes fail to 
adequately recognize the importance of context.76  These statutes do not 
adequately distinguish between the research and clinical contexts, between 
different kinds of research, and whether genetic information is collected in 
medical or employment settings. Interestingly, many statutes implicitly 
recognize context by creating exceptions for genetic information collected for 
the government’s benefit, reducing the strength of the genetic protections for 
individuals when the information is collected and used by the state. 
Although most genetic privacy statutes distinguish between genetic 
information that is easily linked to an identifiable individual and anonymous 
 
 75. For example, the Oregon Genetic Privacy Act explicitly extends its protections to 
include not only the individual but also the individual’s genetic family.  Oregon’s Senate Bill 
114, codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 192.531 (2001), passed into law and effective beginning 
January 2001, contains the legislative finding that “an analysis of an individual’s DNA provides 
information not only about the individual, but also about blood relatives of the individual, with 
the potential for impacting family privacy, including reproductive decisions.”  Id. 
 76. See, e.g., S. B. 114, 71st Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001).  The bill does create 
different categories of genetic information depending on the degree to which the genetic 
information can be linked to a particular individual.  Nevertheless, the statute mandates that 
individuals be notified that their genetic material is used for research even if the genetic 
information is completely anonymous (it is impossible to link the information to the individual).  
Id. 
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genetic information, the focus of the protective scheme remains on the genetic 
information and not on the context.  The distinction between linked and 
anonymous genetic information is different from recognizing context because 
the distinction makes no attempt to consider the substantive quality of the 
genetic information. 
The failure to recognize the contexts within which researchers uncover 
genetic information elevates genetic information to an “essential entity” and 
distorts the meaning of identity by placing too much value on the genetic 
character of information, instead of looking at how the substantive information 
might impact individual identity.  Ironically, protecting all genetic information 
just because it is somehow derived from DNA brings us closer to the harms 
Nelkin, Lindee, Finkler and others warn against, and brings us closer to 
formalizing the kind of  “we are nothing more than our genetics” view 
promoted by Crick.  Legal protections of genetic information should recognize 
that genetic information obtained in the research context may not have the 
same impact as genetic information within clinical contexts.  Legal protections 
should also acknowledge that not all research is the same.  The legal 
protections should incorporate an understanding that different kinds of research 
involve different kinds of individual interests in genetic information. 
Legal protections for genetic information in the clinical setting make sense 
for the same reasons that legal protections exist for other confidential medical 
information; there is significant risk that such information might lead to 
discrimination or adversely impact individual autonomy, privacy or identity.  
The distinction between genetic and non-genetic information is often 
difficult.77  However, if the law effectively protects all important confidential 
medical information in the clinical setting, there is little need to distinguish 
between genetic and non-genetic information, at least for the purposes of 
protecting privacy and autonomy.  Admittedly, the legal protections for 
confidential medical information are not as strong and effective as they might 
be.  Notwithstanding these deficiencies, implementation of stronger protections 
for the difficult to define category of genetic information will not strengthen 
the confidentiality protections of other medical information.78 
 
 77. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 6, at 21 (arguing against genetic exceptionalism on 
various grounds including the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between genetic and non-
genetic medical information).  See also Diver & Cohen, supra note 8, at 1451 (discussing the 
difficulty in defining what sources comprise legally protected genetic information, and noting that 
medical history and direct observations can divulge much genetic information). 
 78. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 6, at 23.  The authors point out that laws emphasizing 
the difference between genetic information and other kinds of health information foster genetic 
exceptionalism, which they do not think is appropriate for a number of reasons.  Id.  One reason 
is that it is “unfair to persons with non-genetic conditions by excluding them from the protection 
of private interests which they would otherwise be entitled if their condition has a genetic origin.”  
Id. at 23-24. 
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The legislative failure to distinguish between the research and clinical 
contexts, and between different kinds of research, reflects a lack of 
understanding about the kinds of genetic information research typically 
involves.  A brief explanation of the different contexts might lend clarity to the 
argument advocating such distinctions. 
B. Tissue in the Bank 
There is a difference between research on tissue used primarily by 
physicians for routine diagnostic and therapeutic purposes and research done 
by researchers on tissue removed explicitly as part of prospective clinical 
trials.  Tissue removed as biopsy tissue, or as part of a therapeutic operative 
procedure, like taking out a segment of colon for colon cancer, is used 
primarily for therapy and diagnosis.  Typically, a pathologist looks at this 
tissue and gives either an initial diagnosis or confirms an existing one.  After 
the removed tissue serves its diagnostic or therapeutic purpose, a laboratory 
routinely stores the tissue or parts of the tissue.  One can think of this tissue as 
“banked,” held safely for possible future use.  Occasionally, researchers return 
to this “banked” tissue to conduct studies to learn about a certain disease, 
particularly cancer.  They may perform tests uncovering genetic information.79  
As a part of these tests, researchers may de-identify the information in an effort 
to protect patient confidentiality.  They would give the tissue and the 
accompanying clinical information a number with access limited to a few 
researchers. 
In contrast, researchers in prospective clinical research take tissue for the 
primary purpose of doing research on the tissue, although oftentimes, the 
sample of tissue also serves diagnostic purposes.  Notwithstanding, in many 
cases, this tissue would not be removed if not for the research.  Subjects in this 
kind of research give specific informed consent.  An Institutional Review 
Board typically reviews this kind of research to ensure that the research is 
generally worthwhile and that research subjects are adequately protected.  An 
obvious potential conflict exists for the physician involved in this kind of 
 
 79. See Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored 
Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786 (1995) (consensus statement); Karl T. Kelsey, Informed 
Consent for Genetic Research, 275 JAMA 1085 (1996) (voicing concern that consent 
requirements for research use of stored tissue will cause a reduction in the numbers of samples 
available for research); Wayne W. Grody, Molecular Pathology, Informed Consent, and the 
Paraffin Block, 4 DIAGNOSTIC MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY 155 (1995) (voicing concern that 
consent requirements for research use of stored tissue will cause a reduction in the numbers of 
samples available for research); Rebecca D. Pentz et al., Research Letter: Informed Consent for 
Tissue Research, 282 JAMA 1625 (1999) (finding no reduction in accrual of tissue samples after 
adding two questions to the informed consent; one specifying that the tissue will be banked and 
the other asking whether the patient would want to be informed if the research uncovers any 
medically useful information). 
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research because it takes place in a clinical setting.80  The doctor has an interest 
in the research, yet must maintain his obligations as the research subject’s 
physician.  A recent Harris pole concluded that only about one-third of adults 
in the United States are “very confident” that patients in clinical trials receive 
“very good” medical care, although more than 80% of the poll respondents 
believed that such trials were “essential” or “very important.”81  An example of 
prospective clinical research trials is testing of a new drug to treat leukemia.  A 
researcher divides a group of people who have a particular type of leukemia 
into two groups.  Researchers/physicians collect blood samples and bone 
marrow biopsies and perform various imaging studies to measure the disease 
course.  Researchers perform various tests, including genetic tests, on the 
collected samples. 
Not all genetic information is the same, even within the same research 
protocol.  Some of the collected genetic information, such as whether a patient 
has a subtype of the disease associated with a worse or better prognosis might 
reasonably impact patients and might be used by third parties to the detriment, 
or benefit, of the patient.  Other genetic information, such as identification of a 
section of DNA encoding a protein not previously associated with the type of 
leukemia, would not reasonably impact clinical outcome or serve any clinical 
purpose because too little is known about the protein.  Third party insurers or 
employers would be unlikely to use this information, since they would not 
know what it means.  The legal safeguards in these different scenarios should 
recognize the different contexts to closely correlate the degree of legal 
protections with the degree of risk to an individual being harmed by 
dissemination of genetic information. 
The differences between prospective clinical research and retrospective 
research on banked tissue collected in the usual course of medical care are 
important.  First, the informed consent requirements differ.  In the tissue bank 
case, the principal reason for the invasive procedure is therapeutic or 
diagnostic with the primary benefit hopefully flowing to the patient. The 
patient gives informed consent for the invasive biopsy or operation knowing 
that there is a direct therapeutic benefit.  Informed consent may require that the 
physician inform the patient of the possibility of research on the removed 
tissue, but the primary purpose of the procedure remains therapeutic or 
diagnostic.  In the past, informed consent likely did not include an explicit 
statement that genetic research might be done, since genetic research fell under 
the more general category of research, which is included in the informed 
 
 80. See Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical 
Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423 (2001) (part of a symposium about Trust Relationships). 
 81. See Public Uneasiness About Patient Care in Clinical Trials Revealed in Harris Poll, 1 
MED RES. L. & POL’Y 48, 49 (2002). 
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consent.82  Prospective research, in contrast, is unlikely to produce any direct 
benefit to the patient or research subject.  The principles of informed consent 
require that the patient explicitly consent to the use of their tissue for relatively 
well-defined research purposes.  Specific informed consent is essential because 
the patient would not undergo an invasive procedure if not for the research.  
This is one way in which research on previously banked tissue is 
fundamentally different from prospective research where small amounts of 
tissue are taken only for research purposes. 
Another difference lies in tradition.  In the United States and England, 
tissue removed for diagnostic purposes following the patient’s informed 
consent for an invasive procedure was historically available for research once 
the diagnostic purposes of the tissue were fulfilled.83  It was considered 
potential waste84 and property of the hospital or pathology laboratory.85  For 
 
 82. Admittedly, tissue-banked retrospective research potentially effects patient interests if it 
uncovers relevant clinical information.  However, federal regulations do not allow the release of 
clinically relevant results unless it is from an accredited clinical laboratory and most research labs 
are not clinical labs.  See William Grizzle et al., Recommended Policies for Uses of Human Tissue 
in Research, Education and Quality Control, 123 ARCH. PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 
296, 297 (1999); Genetic Testing Under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments, 65 
Fed. Reg. 25,928-34 (May 4, 2000). 
 83. See Peter N. Furness, Research Using Human Tissue—A Crisis of Supply?, 195 J. 
PATHOLOGY 277, 277 (2001). Furness refers to the Nuffield Council of Bioethics in 1995, which 
concluded that it was reasonable to believe that patients have abandoned their tissue once they 
have consented to its removal for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes.  Id. 
 84. See Julia D. Mahoney, The Market For Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163 (2000) 
(discussing the need to recognize the ubiquity of commercial activity in transfers of human tissue 
in order to evaluate and better regulate the activity, particularly as new uses are uncovered with 
advancing biotechnology).  Mahoney writes, “[U]ntil the medical advances of the past century, 
however, human tissue from a living body was of use, almost exclusively to its original 
possessor.”  Id. at 170. 
 85. See  Jonathan I. Epstein, Pathologists and the Judicial Process: How to Avoid it, 25 AM. 
J. SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 527 (2001).  A “Letter to the Editor” from a physician in Argentina 
expressed surprise at Epstein’s statement that tissue received for diagnostic purposes does not 
belong to the patient.  The Argentinean doctor wrote that in Argentina such tissue belongs to the 
patient, since the patient paid for the work done on the tissue. Richard Drut, Letter to the Editor, 
Who is the Owner of the Slides, Blocks and Fixed Tissues?, 26 AM. J. SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 
274, 274 (2002) (citing Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990); 
Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., 717 A.2d 140 (Conn. 1998)).  Jonathan I. Epstein & Richard 
Kidwell, Authors’ Reply, Who Is the Owner of the Slides, Blocks, and Fixed Tissues, 26 AM. J. 
SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 274, 274 (2002).  The authors, a pathologist and a lawyer, interpret 
Cornelio as holding that the patient “possessed no property right in her cells, contained in pap 
smear specimen slides.”  Id.  They point out that the lower court found that the patient did not 
expect to retain possession of the cells after their removal and that the pap smears constituted part 
of the medical record.  Id.  Issues that Epstein and Kidwell do not discuss include what if the 
patient does have an expectation of retaining a right, such as a privacy right, in the cells or tissue? 
Possession does not necessarily include every stick in the bundle of property rights and as public 
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example, a patient consented to having a lung tumor removed.  After the 
surgeon and the pathologist examine the tissue, the tissue is stored as required 
by federal law.86  Researchers may then use the stored tissue for research on 
lung tumors. 
The often-cited case, Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 
affirmed that the patient did not retain a property right in tissue or cells 
removed for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes.87  The precise parameters of 
informed consent in cases like Moore, which involve tissue removed for 
diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and the subsequent commercial benefit for 
the physician or researcher, remain problematic.  Until recently, most 
pathology departments in the United States never questioned whether there 
might be any problem with doing research on bits of tissue retained after the 
tissue had served its diagnostic utility. 
Recently, however, pathology departments now understand that in many 
cases approval by the Institutional Review Board is required before anyone 
conducts research on banked tissue even though this kind of research is not 
“clinical research” in the sense of the traditional prospective clinical trial. 
This relatively recent shift in the practice and understanding of 
pathologists and researchers is largely the result of heightened legal, public and 
institutional awareness about the special concerns regarding genetic 
information.  In Oregon, for example, the Oregon Privacy Act requires that 
patients provide their specific informed consent for genetic research done on 
their tissue samples unless the research is anonymous research.88  If the 
 
expectations and understanding changes (improves?), so too might the outcome of a case like 
Cornelio. 
 86. One federal regulation requires that a clinical laboratory “retain stained slides at least ten 
years from the date of examination and retain specimen blocks at least two years from the date of 
examination.”  42 C.F.R. § 493.1259(b) (2002).  The slides referred to are glass slides upon 
which thinly cut sections of tissue are placed and stained.  A pathologist looks at these under a 
microscope to give a diagnosis.  The tissue comes from the specimen blocks, which contain the 
biopsy tissue or portions of a tumor removed. 
 87. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (recall that the final 
holding in the case was about the fiduciary aspect of the patient-doctor relationship and what this 
meant in the context of the physician fulfilling her obligations to the patient while obtaining 
informed consent); Christopher Scott Pennisi, Note, More on Moore: A Novel Strategy for 
Compensating the Human Sources of Patentable Cell-Line Inventions Based on Existing Law, 11 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 747 (2001) (exploring some of the property aspects 
of Moore and proposing the shop rights doctrine; recommending changing informed consent so 
that patients retain interests in inventions derived from their tissue); William Boulier, Note, 
Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body 
Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693 (1995). 
 88. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.531 (2001) (defining anonymous research as “research conducted 
in such a manner that the identity of an individual who has provided a sample, or the identity of 
an individual from whom genetic information has been obtained or the identity of the individual’s 
blood relatives, cannot be determined”). 
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research will be anonymous (individual identity cannot be determined), the 
statute requires that someone notify patients that their tissue may be used for 
anonymous genetic research.  In addition, the patient or research subject may 
request that the tissue sample not be used for anonymous research.89 
This heightened awareness of researchers and the general public signifies a 
change in the social meaning of genetic information.  Resulting in part from 
regulations and statutes, the heightened awareness of the special character of 
genetic information and the apparent increased privacy safeguards are changes 
in the right direction.  However, a better understanding of genetic research 
might help protect individual identity without moving toward genetic 
essentialism and expanding, as Kaja Finkler would say, genetic hegemony. 
C. Informed Consent Is an Awkward Fit for Genetic Information in the 
Context of Retrospective Research on Banked Tissue 
Genetic information in the clinical context is governed by pre-existing 
theories for informed consent and general confidentiality requirements.  For 
example, the typical informed consent for a clinical genetic test would involve 
someone telling the patient about the risks of the invasive procedure, the 
meaning of the genetic test results, including the disease for which the genetic 
assay is testing, and about alternatives other than the test.  The patient may 
visit with a genetic counselor who may discuss a variety of additional issues, 
including the impact on family members.  Similarly, for prospective research, 
the research subjects will be required to give informed consent before the 
research project begins because investigators will have an idea about what the 
genetic test is looking for.  For prospective research, however, the researchers 
will not have a good understanding of what the results of a genetic assay will 
mean because a better understanding of, for example, expression of a particular 
gene and its relationship to disease is exactly what the research is trying to 
clarify. 
In retrospective research, the patient or research subject cannot give true 
informed consent for specific research at the time their tissue is removed 
because, typically, there will be little information about the research.  New 
 
  Federal regulations also distinguish between anonymous tissue samples and identified 
samples.  Distinctions are made between anonymous, signifying that no identification was ever 
attached, and made anonymous, signifying that any link between identity and the tissue is 
irreversibly removed.  45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f)(2) (2001). 
 89. OR. REV. STAT. § 192.537(2)(a) (2001) (“A person may use an individual’s DNA sample 
or genetic information for anonymous research only if the individual was notified the sample or 
genetic information may be used for anonymous research and the individual did not, at the time 
of notification, request that the sample not be used for anonymous research.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 
192.53 (2001) (the required informed consent for genetic information is different from what the 
statute terms “blanket informed consent” because the informed consent required for genetic 
research must specify that the tissue sample might be involved in genetic research). 
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techniques and new hot research topics arise in the time between tissue 
procurement and the initiation of research.  Often at the time the patient gives 
informed consent for tissue removal, the diagnosis is not known.  Therefore, at 
the time of consent neither the patient nor the researcher will know basic facts 
about the research (for example, does the research involve benign or malignant 
tissue?).  For these reasons, it is more appropriate that patients or research 
subjects in the setting of retrospective research give their authorization for the 
future use of their tissue for possible and unspecified genetic research rather 
than their informed consent.  This is recognized by the various state and 
federal privacy rules that require authorization for possible future use of 
patients’ tissue.  These provisions recognize the poor fit between traditional 
theories of informed consent and retrospective research on banked tissue.90  
Another advantage of the authorization approach is that it allows patients or 
potential research subjects the chance to change their minds.  Once they have 
given authorization and are aware that their tissue might be used for genetic 
research, they can return to the institution and withdraw their authorization for 
subsequent research.91 
Another reason for this poor fit is that typically the primary reason for the 
invasive procedure is therapeutic or diagnostic.  Patients are likely focused on 
this primary reason rather than the secondary chance that some yet unidentified 
researcher may do research on the tissue.  Even if the consent could be specific 
enough to be informed, the patient giving consent may not fully understand the 
scope of their consent regarding possible future research.  An alternative is that 
the law could require researchers to go back to patients for specific consent for 
well-characterized research.  However, this approach would be onerous 
because of the difficulties and expense of tracking down patients years after 
the biopsy or operation. 
Despite the practical difficulties with using informed consent to authorize 
retrospective research on banked tissue, the underlying purpose of informed 
 
 90. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) regulations 
endorsed by President Clinton and President Bush include requirements that research subjects 
sign an authorization statement for the use and disclosure of their private medical information.  
The HIPAA requirements for valid authorization include a specific and meaningful description of 
the information, an expiration date and a statement that the patient or research subject has a right 
to revoke authorization.  See George J. Annas, Medical Privacy and Medical Research—Judging 
the New Federal Regulations, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 216 (2002) (citing Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000)).  In a response 
to a letter to the editor, Annas noted that the Bush administration may modify the privacy rules 
and that the Department of Health and Human Services invited comments on some of the privacy 
rules.  See George J. Annas, Author’s Reply, Medical Privacy and Medical Research, 346 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1674, 1674 (2002). 
 91. This may become problematic when human tissue is transferred to other research 
institutions and biotechnology companies.  See Mahoney, supra note 84, at 167-96 (discussing 
the ubiquity of commercial dealings involving human tissue and the issues raised). 
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consent (to protect patient self-determination and autonomy) remains.  The 
theoretical foundation of informed consent, originally articulated by Justice 
Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of The New York Hospital as the right to 
self-determination, has evolved over the years, but the emphasis on the 
patient’s autonomy remains.92  Although many genetic privacy acts seek to 
protect individual rights in autonomy and privacy, genetic information does not 
always affect autonomy and privacy.  Because there is harm in overprotecting 
genetic information, the key becomes developing a method to distinguish 
between when the law should and should not protect genetic information. 
D. Not All Tissue Genetics Is the Same—Tumor Genetics vs. Germline 
Mutations 
An individual’s interests in his or her genetic information depends upon 
the kind of tissue used in the genetic research.  Some commentators note that 
genetic research is considered sensitive because it often involves highly 
predictive germline mutations in bad diseases like breast or ovarian cancer.93  
This kind of germline research is likely to uncover genetic information that 
implicates family members in addition to the individual whose tissue is 
examined (the proband, in the language of genetics).  However, when the 
research is on tumor mutations, not germline mutations, it is often not 
predictive of family risk (depending on the type of tumor).  Much research 
performed on tissue-banked material is research looking at tumor genetics and 
not germline mutations. 
Admittedly, all cancer may be genetic, but it is to varying degrees 
heritable.94  The risk of any person of getting cancer, including sporadic 
tumors, is influenced by various hereditary and environmental factors.  For 
example, most lung cancer is strongly related to cigarette smoking, but the 
mortality rates of people with lung cancer are greater among non-smoking 
relatives of smokers than among non-smokers who do not have any smokers in 
 
 92. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).  In Schloendorff, 
Justice Cardozo wrote: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”  Id. at 95-
96.  For a brief account of how the informed consent theory evolved from Cardozo’s common 
law battery-based approach to the recent negotiated terms that depend fundamentally on patient-
doctor discourse, see Ken Marcus Gatter, Protecting Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed 
Consent and Deliberative Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941 (1999). 
 93. Laura M. Beskow et al., Informed Consent for Population-Based Research Involving 
Genetics, 286 JAMA 2315 (2001). 
 94. See FINKLER, supra note 54, at 58 (examining the impact of a genetic basis of cancer 
means for some people and maintaining that the emphasis on genetics turns some healthy people 
into people who believe they are sick, yet without any of the signs or symptoms for which they 
are at increased risk). 
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their extended family.95  The influence of genetics on the development of 
cancer in individuals is likely a continuum.  On one side of the continuum are 
the clearly inherited cancer syndromes like childhood retinoblastoma, where 
carriers of the gene are 10,000 times at greater risk and the tumor is usually in 
both eyes.  At the same end of the continuum are certain breast and ovarian 
cancers that present at a younger age than most breast and ovarian cancers and 
are linked to the genes BRCA-1 and BRCA-2.96  These are non-sporadic 
tumors. 
At the other end of the continuum is the kind of colon cancer that presents 
in a seventy-year-old man, or chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), a cancer 
of the blood and bone marrow, presenting in a fifty-year-old individual.  These 
“sporadic” or “spontaneous” cancers do not run in families.  Although 
researchers may ultimately find a hereditary component to the degree of risk 
for particular cancers in every individual, the particular genetic event studied 
by scientists does not have any known hereditary component.  For example, 
CML involves a translocation of a piece of chromosome nine and a piece of 
chromosome twenty-two.  This translocation is neither present at birth nor in 
the person’s non-leukemic cells.  Perhaps there is a genetic clue in the 
germline genetics of patients who later on develop CML that we do not yet 
know about, and a researcher would not find it if studying the leukemia cells.  
Therefore, even if there is an undiscovered hereditary component to a sporadic 
tumor, research looking at the sporadic tumor genetics is some distance away 
from identifying genetic information of the individual from whom the cancer 
arises. 
Although many researchers believe that genetic predisposition contributes 
to most “spontaneous” tumors,97 the degree of increased risk in the colon 
cancer in the seventy-year-old man that is represented by genetic 
predisposition is significantly less than the risk that is represented by the 
presence of the retinoblastoma gene in the five-year-old boy.  Should the legal 
protections be the same for the “relevant” genetic information in the five-year-
old boy and the statistically insignificant genetic information in the seventy-
year-old man?  Similarly, why should the law protect genetic information that 
represents, for example, a statistically insignificant increase in colon cancer 
risk in a seventy-year-old man and not protect information that indicates that if 
a fifty-year-old individual eats nothing but fatty fast food, that individual is 
likely to have a much greater risk of a heart attack?  Perhaps both pieces of 
 
 95. COTRAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 275. 
 96. Id. at 276. 
 97. Id. 
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information deserve privacy protections (and should be medically confidential) 
as pieces of information that comprise the whole of personal identity.98 
E. Most Research Produces Genetic Information with Little Impact on 
Individual Identity 
Another reason why the research context is important is that most scientific 
research addresses small questions with little or no impact on individual 
identity.  Not only do researchers rarely ask questions that are clinically 
significant by themselves, but the research seldom answers the questions 
without requiring additional research.99  This is not to say the research is 
clinically insignificant, but this research serves as only a small piece of a larger 
puzzle.  Moreover, scientists must generally verify the results and conduct 
additional research because the results give rise to new questions.  Non-
verified pieces of genetic information that lack clinical significance should not 
impact individual identity.  Admittedly, however, a risk remains that insurers, 
employers, researchers, participants and families may use the information 
improperly and erroneously interpret the results if the information is linked to 
an individual or a group.  The accuracy of the conclusions drawn from the 
genetic information is largely irrelevant when genetic information is linked to 
an individual or a group and therefore suffers harm from improper use. 
F. Identifying Information 
The problem is that genetic information about tumors and normal tissue 
means little unless genotype can be correlated with phenotype.  Researchers 
need to correlate genetic information with clinical information to reach any 
meaningful conclusions.100  For example, discovering that a particular tumor 
expresses a new protein is only valuable if a researcher has access to 
information about how the new protein may be related to clinical information.  
Relevant clinical information includes such things as the tumor and patient 
 
 98. The recent explosion in Internet personal data has lead to many articles discussing 
informational privacy issues.  See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000) (discussing various approaches, including the property rights model 
and a market-oriented system that uses a system with a default licensing of personal data 
provision); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 
(1999) (arguing that privacy norms are important for democracy). 
 99. For example, a recent issue of BLOOD published the following articles: Olivier Giet et 
al., Increased Binding and Defective Migration Across Fibronectin of Cycling Hematopoietic 
Progenitor Cells, 99 BLOOD 2023 (2002); Letetia C. Jones et al., Expression of C/EPP from the 
C/ebp Gene Locus is Sufficient for Normal Hematopoiesis In Vivo, 99 BLOOD 2032 (2002).  
Admittedly, not all titles are so esoteric, however, isolated study results mean little to an 
individual study participant and the results are unlikely to lead to identification of the study 
participants without further identifying information. 
 100. See generally Beskow et al., supra note 93. 
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behavior, how long and how well did the patient live, what kind of treatment 
was given, how far the tumor had spread (stage), what the tumor looked like 
(grade and type) and the age and strength of the patient.  Once a researcher has 
access to sufficient patient-identifying information, then the researcher, 
research subject or some other person might be able to identify the individual. 
It is when the individual’s identity can be discovered that the legal 
protections of the individual and the individual’s genetic family become 
important.  Even if the genetic information derived from research is not enough 
to draw valid scientific conclusions, legal protections are warranted when the 
information and the identity of the individual might be linked.  Once the 
individual is indentifiable, there is a risk that the information may be 
improperly used by insurers or employers, or that researchers, participants, 
families or others may erroneously interpret the results. 
The law properly protects linked information because it is medical 
information, not because it is genetic information.  Both the genetic 
information and the clinical information deserve legal protection.  An 
individual’s legal rights should be implicated depending on the substantive 
attributes of the information, rather than the single attribute of the information 
being genetic.  For example, genetic information that impacts identity would 
include something like the retinoblastoma gene, because this reasonably affects 
how individuals think of themselves.  Certainly, many patients with cancer 
undergo a significant change in their identity.  Lance Armstrong, who won the 
Tour de France bike race four years in a row (as of winter 2003) after he had 
cancer, apparently underwent a significant change in the way he viewed 
himself and life because of his high stage cancer and his close brush with 
death.  Similarly, people who learn that they carry a gene that significantly 
increases their risk for a particular cancer also feel an impact on their identity.  
Genetic information that reveals that a person and her family have an increased 
risk for an autoimmune disease impacts the identity of the individual and the 
whole family. 
It is when the genetic information reasonably impacts identity that the law 
should implement increased protections.  This can be accomplished without 
leading to deleterious change in the social meaning of genetic information. 
PART IV—THE TORT OF MISAPPROPRIATION OF IDENTITY APPLIED TO 
GENETIC INFORMATION 
A. Identity as the Touchstone for Legal Protection of Genetic Information 
Treating all research contexts identically because they involve any aspect 
of genetic information is an example of genetic essentialism that alters the 
social meaning of genetic information.  To avoid these pitfalls, legal 
protections for genetic information in the research context should focus on the 
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substantive content of the information to assign the appropriate degree of 
protection for the genetic information.  I propose that legal protections are 
appropriate for genetic information that reasonably impacts individual identity.  
The focus on the impact on individual identity allows the law to better 
recognize the context and substantive content of the genetic information. 
For example, this approach would mandate legal protections for genetic 
information that uncovers a significant risk for the development of a 
neurodegenerative disorder because this is genetic information that reasonably 
impacts identity.  In contrast, genetic information arising in the research 
context that has minimal clinically significant repercussions for the individual, 
while still confidential and legally protected because it is confidential medical 
information, would not merit legal protection as specifically protected genetic 
information because it does not reasonably impact individual identity. 
The law would still require general consent before researchers could use 
the patient’s tissue for research.  However, by taking into consideration the 
context and focusing on the substance of the genetic information, the legal 
protection for genetic information would not treat all genetic information the 
same based only on the seemingly overriding fact of the information being 
genetic.  Moreover, identity provides a more solid theoretical foundation for 
the protection of genetic information.  This approach would require that special 
legal protections for genetic information derived from retrospective research 
performed on banked tissue, and would apply only when the genetic 
information reasonably impacts individual identity. 
The initial threshold for implementing legal protections for genetic 
information should be that the genetic information is linked to a patient or 
group.  Commentators generally agree that research using non-linkable data, or 
anonymous data, does not invoke consent requirements.101  Recall, however, 
that even anonymous genetic information, if it is linked to a group, can have 
adverse consequences for all members of the group.  For example, many 
researchers have looked specifically at Ashkenazi Jews.  Professor Dolgin 
states that the disproportionate research attention paid to Ashkenazi Jews has 
led to a disproportionate number of genetic alterations being associated with 
Ashkenazi Jews, thereby reinforcing public perceptions that this group is more 
likely to suffer from genetic alterations, and, thus, furthering historical anti-
Semitic attitudes of Jewish people as more sickly.102  Dolgin’s description of 
the adverse impact of genetic information on group identity reinforces the 
appropriateness of identity as the touchstone for legal protection of genetic 
 
 101. See Patricia (Winnie) Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for National 
Legislation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1996); George J. Annas, Rules for Research on Human Genetic 
Variation—Lessons from Iceland, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1830 (2000). 
 102. Dolgin, supra note 21, at 790-794. 
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information rather than the reliance on a privacy right for the theoretical 
foundation. 
The second question to be reached before deciding if legal protections 
should attach to genetic information should be whether the particular genetic 
information will reasonably impact individual identity.  For example, 
information from a clinical test result that identifies an individual as carrying a 
gene for hemochromatosis deserves protection because a person’s identity is 
reasonably impacted by knowing that one has the disease and its likely 
sequelae.  However, a genetic research result discovering an esoteric tumor 
protein, while still legally protected as confidential medical information (if 
linked to an individual person), should not invoke special legal protections. 
Many genetic privacy statutes are over broad in that they ignore the 
question of context and fail to delineate different kinds of genetic information.  
These shortcomings foster a genetic essentialism that undermines the value we 
traditionally place in individual autonomy.103  A small and clinically 
insignificant bit of an individual’s genetic information is no more private and 
should enjoy no more legal protections than the color of her hair or the size of 
her foot.  When enough bits of information come together, like enough pixels 
on a screen can become a recognizable face, then an individual’s identity may 
be discovered and legal safeguards should apply.  Similarly, if a truly unique 
bit of information is uncovered, then it too should enjoy legal safeguards.  In 
both the quantitative and the qualitative versions, the focus is on what the 
information means rather than simply the single attribute of the information’s 
genetic character.  This approach avoids the definitional difficulties of what 
constitutes genetic information.  It also avoids fostering a climate of genetic 
exceptionalism and provides a theoretical framework for the complex task of 
organizing and regulating the collection, storage and use of genetic 
information. 
B. Appropriation of Identity 
Jonathan Kahn advocates the tort of appropriation of identity as a way for 
the law to protect individual dignity interests and maintain “a legally 
sanctioned space that places control over the self beyond the reach of the 
market.”104  In a recent article, Kahn advocates using the privacy-based tort of 
 
 103. See generally id. 
 104. Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light, supra note 10, at 214.  He aims to “disentangle 
publicity and privacy” because he is concerned that the more common publicity right, based on 
property, has hidden the other important concerns that appropriation of identity protects, such as 
privacy and dignity.  Id.  Whereas publicity rights involve commercial interests, courts have also 
protected personal interests in dignity and integrity of the self.  To illustrate that courts recognize 
the difference, Kahn cites various cases, including Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472 
N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).  In this case, Jacqueline Onassis sued Christian Dior, Inc. 
because Christian Dior used an advertisement with a look alike of her without permission.  Id. at 
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appropriation of identity to resolve the often-cited and often-discussed case of 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California.105  He maintains that the 
current principles of intellectual property law and informed consent do not 
resolve the complex issues of biotechnology represented in Moore.106  Instead, 
Kahn argues that appropriation of identity, discussed by the California Court of 
Appeal in Moore,107 provides the basis for a better resolution of the problems 
raised by Moore. 
Kahn’s insight is valuable because it illustrates a way to provide legal 
recognition of a right in genetic information that is not derivative of an 
underlying property right in tissue and does not exclusively focus on the 
genetic attributes of the information.  Moreover, his approach recognizes a 
continuum of legal interests based on the degree of the impact on individual 
identity. 
Kahn’s focus on the relationship between object (cells in Moore, genetic 
information in the present case) and identity allows him to implement a 
spectrum, or continuum, of legal protections.  He is able to do this because he 
does not simply look at the relationship between the object and the physical 
body or simply focus on the object or information.  Kahn describes his 
 
256.  She sought an injunction rather than monetary damages because she was not asserting an 
infringement of her commercial right to publicize her image.  See id.  Instead, she wanted to 
protect her identity as a person who does not engage in the commercialization of her image. 
 105. Kahn, Biotechnology, supra note 10, at 910-11.  See also Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither 
Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 
AM. J.L. & MED. 77 (2002); Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of 
Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331 (1996); Laura M. Ivey, Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California: Insufficient Protection of Patients’ Rights in the Biotechnological 
Market, 25 GA. L. REV. 489 (1991); Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 
499 (1990); Jeffrey A. Potts, Note, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Expanded 
Disclosure, Limited Property Rights, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1992). 
 106. Kahn, Biotechnology, supra note 10, at 911.  In Moore, the patient, John Moore, had 
treatment of his hairy cell leukemia at the University of California, Los Angeles, Medical Center 
(UCLA-MC), where Dr. Golde confirmed the diagnosis, and John Moore’s spleen was removed 
as part of the then accepted treatment for hairy cell leukemia.  Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480-81 (Cal. 1990).  After the procedure, the doctors and researchers at 
UCLA-MC encouraged John Moore to return for follow-up, in part so that they could get more of 
Moore’s hairy leukemia cells.  Id. at 481.  After approximately three years, Golde and a 
researcher established a cell line and the Regents of the University of California applied for a 
patent.  Id. at 481-82.  When Moore discovered this, he sued, claiming a property-based right in a 
share of profits.  Id. at 482.  He did not claim that his dignity, privacy, or identity had been legally 
harmed.  The California Supreme Court held that Moore’s doctor had breached his fiduciary duty 
and that informed consent was not adequate, but further rejected Moore’s conversion claim.  Id. at 
485, 488.  The Court of Appeal’s discussion about appropriation of identity was not seriously 
considered by the majority in the California Supreme Court decision. 
 107. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 507-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
454 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:423 
approach as “a legal regime for the management of information . . . . in this 
case, information regarded as intimately bound up with a subject’s identity.”108 
In explaining appropriation of identity, Kahn explains that it is the 
improper use of another’s name or image, rather than the physical property or 
body, that historically gave rise to the tort.109  There must be a connection 
between the image or name and a person’s identity.  Kahn comments about 
how remarkable it is that the law recognizes such an “amorphous concept as 
‘identity’”110 and notes that courts have expanded the right to include improper 
use of another’s voice111 and objects that invoke a person’s identity but may be 
separate from their physical person, as in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co.112 
In Motschenbacher, a racing car driver sued R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company for improperly using his recognizable racing car in an advertisement 
without his permission.113  The case concerned an advertisement starring 
Motschenbacher’s race car, which Motschenbacher uniquely identified with 
special markings.114  Although Motschenbacher was not recognizable in the 
advertisement, words promoting the defendant’s cigarettes were indirectly 
attributed to Motschenbacher because words in a text balloon were placed next 
to the unrecognizable racing car driver sitting in the recognizable car.115  The 
plaintiff established that many people recognized the car as Motschenbacher’s, 
but the trial court dismissed the case because the plaintiff was not directly 
identified and the racing car was, in effect, too far removed from the 
plaintiff.116  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the 
use of the distinctively Motschenbacher car implied Motschenbacher as the 
driver.117  The court, therefore, recognized the car as a constitutive part of 
Motschenbacher’s identity.  Alternatively, the court recognized that 
Motschenbacher imprinted parts of the car with aspects of his identity.118  The 
court’s implicit holding was that the constitutive object is connected to the 
individual’s identity. 
Moore’s case is problematic because of the difficulties in characterizing 
Moore’s legal rights in his tissue.  The history of the case, from the diversity of 
the decisions and opinions of the three courts that dealt with the facts to the 
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different views offered in the extensive commentary on the case, highlights the 
difficulty of defining individual interests in information derived from human 
tissue.  Moore wanted monetary compensation and eschewed any identity 
aspects of his claim, despite the California Court of Appeal’s sympathy for a 
claim that Moore’s identity was misappropriated.  He wanted to share in the 
profits from the cell line derived from his cells and centered his claim on 
conversion of his personal property (his cells).  The trial court dismissed the 
claim, but the California Court of Appeal reversed, writing that, “a patient 
must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her tissues.  To 
hold otherwise would open the door to a massive invasion of human privacy 
and dignity in the name of medical progress.”119  The California Court of 
Appeal expressed interest in allowing Moore’s claim, but was concerned about 
commercialization of the human body and the potential detrimental effects on 
human dignity.120  It is this concern with dignity and the effects on identity that 
likely influenced the California Court of Appeal to advocate an appropriation 
of identity claim, and influenced the reasoning that DNA deserved the same 
protections as a name or image because DNA was constitutive of a person’s 
identity. 
In the end, the California Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s 
appropriation of identity approach and Moore’s conversion claim.121  In part, 
the California Supreme Court dismissed the appropriation argument because 
Moore insisted on the property aspects of his claim.  Quickly dismissing the 
appropriation argument as “irrelevant to the issue of conversion,”122 the 
Supreme Court settled instead on the doctor’s breach of fiduciary duty.  
Because Moore’s physician was also the researcher who used Moore’s cells, 
the court reasoned that the physician failed to fulfill his fiduciary duty when he 
did not tell Moore the whole story about his interests in obtaining Moore’s 
cells.123  Thus, the California Supreme Court sidestepped the more difficult 
issue of characterizing Moore’s legal interest in his cells.  The California 
Supreme Court decided that there is no property right in one’s cells, but that 
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somehow legal interests attach to these cells because it is important that the 
doctor or researcher tells patients what will happen to them. 
The California Supreme Court did implicitly recognize a connection 
between the patient or research subject and the cells after they are removed 
from the body, although the adequacy of the conventional informed consent 
(consent for removing the spleen in the first place) was not at issue.  However, 
it is unclear whether the parameters of the informed consent requirements were 
influenced by the physician or researcher’s intentions or by the fact that the 
patient retained some uncharacterized interest in the cells after removal from 
the body. 
The case remains controversial because of its failure to give Moore much 
of anything.  The case is cited by some science researchers for the idea that 
patients do not retain any interests in their tissue once they have given 
conventional informed consent.124  The case is instructive because it introduces 
issues that remain largely unsettled today.  Many commentators advocate, and 
rare state statutes maintain, that genetic information is a property right.125  One 
of the core provisions in the model genetic privacy act written by Professor 
Annas, is that, “DNA is the property of the individual from whom it is 
obtained.”126  Oregon’s initial Genetic Privacy Act characterized a person’s 
genetic information as property, stating, “An individual’s genetic information 
and DNA sample are the property of the individual . . . .”127  Subsequently, the 
Oregon legislature revised the statute and characterized the individual’s right 
in genetic information as a privacy right.  Although most state and federal 
approaches allow a privacy right in genetic information, the difficulty in 
characterizing the right precisely remains.  One advantage of using the tort of 
appropriation of identity is that it combines aspects of property and privacy128 
law and its inherent fluidity is well suited to the difficulty of characterizing 
genetic information. 
Kahn makes an important distinction between the privacy-based tort of 
appropriation of identity, which relies on the individual’s interest in 
maintaining “integrity of identity,” and the more common property-based right 
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of publicity, which involves the commercial value of one’s likeness.  For 
example, when Jacqueline Onassis sued Christian Dior, Inc. because the 
fashion design company used an advertisement with a look alike of Onassis 
without Onassis’ permission, she based her claim on a privacy-centered 
appropriation of identity claim because she did not want to be known as 
someone who allowed her likeness to be used for selling things.129  Her action 
relied on a broad interpretation of the New York Civil Rights law, which 
prohibited a “person, firm or corporation” from using for commercial purposes 
the “name, portrait or picture of any living person” without prior written 
permission.130  Christian-Dior did not use a picture of Onassis or make any 
direct reference to her name.  In its decision, the New York court focused on 
the word “portrait” in the statute and traced case law back seventy years to 
conclude that “[t]he principle to be distilled from a study of the statute and of 
the cases construing it is that all persons, of whatever station in life, from the 
relatively unknown to the world famous, are to be secured against rapacious 
commercial exploitation.”131  The statute, the court reasoned, was “intended to 
protect the essence of the person, his or her identity or persona from being 
unwillingly or unknowingly misappropriated for the profit of another.”132  
Interestingly, Onassis and the court emphasized the dignity aspects of the 
underlying right.  Onassis did this by seeking an injunction rather than 
monetary damages, and the court stressed that the right belonged to every 
person, to the poor and unknown, and to the rich and famous.  Notwithstanding 
this emphasis on dignity, the court and the statute limit the legal protections to 
infringements of individual dignity to the commercial context.  This result, 
Kahn claims, is from courts failing to distinguish properly between the two 
separate torts of publicity and appropriation of identity.133 
As mentioned before, an important aspect of the tort of appropriation of 
identity is its reliance on the relationship between the individual identity and 
the image, or voice or part of an individual’s identity that was appropriated.  
The fact that everyone’s fingerprints are unique does not merit legal 
protections for the fingerprint unless it reasonably impacts the individual’s 
identity.  A stranger might lift my fingerprint from a public handrail and 
publish its image without me suffering any harm.  If the stranger attaches my 
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picture to the fingerprint, then I may have a legal claim that my identity has 
been unreasonably impacted, but the focus of the claim would be on how 
publishing the picture impacts my identity rather than the fingerprints.  If the 
stranger added a caption proclaiming my appreciation for a commercial 
product, then I have a stronger legal claim because the impact on my identity is 
increased.  However, the underlying claim remains based on the recognizable 
picture rather than the fingerprint. 
Is genetic information more like the unique fingerprint or the unique 
picture?  The answer, of course, depends on the type of genetic information 
and how intimately the information addressed by the genetic information 
connects to an individual.  If over time my fingerprint becomes associated with 
me and my fingerprint becomes recognizable by a significant number of people 
(whatever that number may be), then a connection exists between my 
fingerprint and my identity.  It is only after a sufficient connection exists that 
the use of my fingerprint alone may reasonably impact my identity, like how 
Motschenbacher’s car impacted Motschenbacher’s identity.  Therefore, the use 
of a single fingerprint that does not reasonably impact my identity does not 
merit special legal safeguards because a piece of genetic information that does 
not impact identity should not invoke special legal protections.  Genetic 
information in the research context that has uncertain, unverified and no 
clinically accepted meaning is unlikely to reasonably impact an individual’s 
identity. 
This brief scenario illustrates two points.  The first is the importance of the 
relational aspects. Kahn recognized this and wrote, “[I]t is the relationship 
between an individual and a particular image that establishes whether her 
identity is bound up in the image.  The court’s opinion overlooks this relational 
aspect of identity, simply asserting the material basis of identity in DNA.”134  
A short strip of DNA, lacking any unique features, will not impact identity 
even if it is linked to an individual.  Analogously, my identity is not impacted 
if some stranger collects a fingerprint, which ends up being mine, as part of an 
art project, unless my fingerprint was somehow, like Motschenbacher’s car, 
well known as my fingerprint.  Only by establishing a connection between the 
individual and a unique piece of genetic information (and not all genetic 
information is unique) will there be an impact on identity. 
The second point is how the tort of appropriation of identity relies on 
social norms and community standards.  Kahn, contrasting publicity with 
appropriation, notes that determining if something constitutes appropriation is 
governed by local community standards, social norms and democratic control: 
Publicity rights demand accountants and other relevant experts from the realm 
of celebrity and marketing to determine damages.  Appropriation calls upon 
the local community to consider whether an outrage or affront to relevant 
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social norms has occurred.  The former involves the virtues and vices of expert 
management.  The latter similarly involve the virtues and vices of local 
democratic control.135 
Allowing social norms and community standards to determine when one’s 
identity is impacted introduces reasonableness.  Under this rubric, one can 
envision how a research subject might successfully claim that her identity was 
appropriated when researchers used the subject’s genetic information in, for 
example, fetal research without telling the subject.  Such use would reasonably 
impact the research subject’s identity.  It might violate relevant social norms.  
Similarly, this approach allows the conclusion that Moore’s identity was 
impacted by knowing that a cell line, which was essentially a clone of a piece 
of him, was distributed around the country. 
The reliance on social norms and community standards used by the tort of 
appropriation of identity would permit researchers to use genetic information 
derived from routinely-banked tissue (with routine informed consent) provided 
the genetic information did not impact an individual’s identity.  The 
determination of whether use of genetic information reasonably impacts 
identity would depend on community standards and social norms.  The 
researcher’s decision whether to go ahead with the research would necessitate 
a judgment about the prevailing community standards and social norms.136  For 
example, a researcher might use banked tissue for genetic research on a tumor 
gene that has no significant impact on identity without getting additional 
consent to that routinely obtained prior to invasive procedures.  These consents 
often include a general provision for the use of tissue for research. 
Another facet of relying upon social norms and community standards is 
that what is considered reasonable changes over time and varies by region.  In 
one jurisdiction, patients may be surprised to know that any genetic research 
might be performed on their tissue and that any genetic information might 
reasonably impact identity (for example, that genetic information used in fetal 
tissue or cloning research might impact identity).  One envisions, perhaps, a 
rural hospital where tissue collected during diagnostic and therapeutic 
procedures is, after diagnosis, sent to a far-away research laboratory for stem 
cell research.  In this kind of community, it makes sense to place the onus on 
researchers or physicians to inform patients or research subjects of the 
potential future use of their tissue.  They might do this as part of the routine 
informed consent form.  It would also behoove researchers in this setting to 
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engage in an aggressive publicity and public education program, with the hope 
of changing the community perceptions about what reasonably impacts 
identity.  In contrast, there may be other jurisdictions where people do not 
believe that every bit of genetic information impacts identity and patients who 
consent to having their tissue used for research would not be surprised to 
discover that researchers conduct future genetic research on this tissue. 
In both jurisdictions, the advantage of the proposed approach is that it 
would allow researchers an opportunity to explain how the pixel of genetic 
information does not reasonably impact identity.  Ultimately, the community 
will decide whether the researcher made a correct judgment about the impact 
of the genetic information on the individual’s identity.  Moreover, the risk-
adverse researcher and institution would likely err on the side of obtaining 
specific consent and make efforts to bring debate into the public arena. 
There are risks to this approach.  One risk is that this approach would not 
offer an easy-to-follow, bright-line rule.  But there are risks with bright line 
rules too. Bright line rules can seem to simplify complex issues and, as in the 
case of many genetic privacy rules, draw the line in the wrong place leading to 
over-broad protections.  Notwithstanding, a risk exists that an emphasis on the 
prevailing community standards may not adequately protect individual 
variations about what makes up a person’s identity.  What may impact the 
identity of one person may not impact another person’s identity. 
For example, in Bitsie v. Walston, the Court of Appeals in New Mexico 
concluded that a picture of an eighteen-month-old Navajo girl in a newspaper 
article about a cerebral palsy fundraising project was not an invasion of 
privacy as a matter of law, because the facts did not offend persons of 
“ordinary sensibilities.”137  The court reached its conclusion despite accepting 
that the evidence showed that traditional Navajo beliefs held that the use of the 
picture of the toddler, a healthy girl without cerebral palsy, in association with 
the disease was bad luck and increased her chances of getting a disease like 
cerebral palsy.138  The court emphasized that “traditional” beliefs were 
different from the “ordinary sensibilities” of  “the developed society on which 
the interest in privacy is based.”139  Although acknowledging that 20,000 
Navajos lived in New Mexico with “traditional” beliefs, the court used a 
unique concept of time and concluded that the tort of invasion of privacy did 
not extend to these “traditional” beliefs because it only applied to the customs 
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of New Mexico at the time the case was decided.140  It did not matter that 
20,000 people held these traditional beliefs at the time court published its 
decision.  It would seem that 20,000 people with a shared belief system are 
enough to qualify as a community and formulate social norms.  The dissent 
recognized the error, writing, “It is erroneous to say that traditional Navajo 
Indians are not people with ‘ordinary sensibilities.’  The same could then be 
said of Irish-Americans, Mexican-Americans, Chinese-Americans, black 
people, Catholics, Protestants and Jews.”141 
Bitsie raises important concerns.  The Navajo view toward the increased 
risk resulting from the association of the toddler’s picture with cerebral palsy is 
similar to the majority view about genetic information.  Many people fear the 
potential of genetic information to predict the future and believe that this 
information reasonably impacts identity.  The association of DNA sequences 
with the development of subsequent disease are cast in terms of increased risk.  
Some might argue that it is the mathematical likelihood of the subsequent 
event that affects the degree that one’s identity is reasonably impacted.  Some 
might argue that the Navajo’s claim is invalid because there is no rational 
connection between the picture and the development of disease.  However, a 
better approach is that the reasonableness is measured in terms of the relevant 
community’s belief in how the individual’s identity will be impacted.  
Applying the tort of appropriation of identity to the context of genetic 
information means that we must be sensitive to the fact that different people 
will have different ideas about what reasonably impacts identity.  But it is this 
variation in views that makes a common-law based remedy applicable. 
PART V—CONCLUSION 
In summary, two important points make appropriation of identity well 
suited to genetic information.  First, it recognizes the importance of the 
relationship between the individual and the object.  The tort, therefore, 
recognizes a continuum of proper legal protections based on the context within 
which genetic information is collected and used and on the substantive content 
of the genetic information.  A legal system that conveys a recognition of the 
prevailing importance of individual identity from DNA will look at the 
substantive content of genetic information rather than only focusing on the fact 
that the information is genetic.  Because the context within which genetic 
information is collected, studied, stored, and otherwise used will effect the 
impact genetic information has on individual identity, the degree of legal 
protection should be tailored to the context.  Recognition of context is one 
critical method for the law to reflect further understanding that the degree of 
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protection rests on the extent to which the genetic information impacts 
individual identity. 
Second, reliance on identity as the keystone in this proposed system of 
governing how to best protect individual genetic information is a better fit than 
privacy law.  Identity is constantly created by ourselves and those around us.  
This process happens in the privacy of our homes, in the public arena of the 
workplace, the schoolyard, the classroom, the athletic arena, and the public 
square.  It is both conscious and accidental, active and passive.  The underlying 
right to privacy is different from publicity because the right to publicity 
emphasizes the marketplace and one’s commercial worth.  Identity, like 
privacy, is in part a dignity interest that all of us possess, but identity more 
directly implicates the result of choices made by individuals.  Many of us to 
varying extents can choose our profession, spouses, friends, and acquaintances.  
The misuse of genetic information impacts one’s identity and the ability to 
create, or influence, one’s identity.  Ironically, legal protections that treat all 
genetic information as synonymous with identity reduce individual opportunity 
to actively participate in forming an identity.142  Such legal protections change 
the social meaning of all genetic information by exclusively looking at the 
genetic attributes of the information instead of examining the substantive 
content and the context of the information.  Despite good intentions, these 
kinds of genetic privacy acts encourage the kind of genetic reductionism 
echoed by Crick’s words quoted earlier. 
Certainly, there should be legal protections against genetic discrimination 
and reasonable safeguards for privacy and confidentiality, but these must be 
done rationally.  The tort of appropriation of identity offers a fluid, 
community-based tool that incorporates changing social norms and recognizes 
the contexts within which genetic information arises.  Whether adopted or not, 
the emphasis on identity is a better starting point for us to analyze the difficult 
and unanswered issues of genetic information. 
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